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Abstract
This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which middlemen
emerge to facilitate trade in an environment of idiosyncratic tastes and
heterogeneous goods. The gains to the traders can be measured along three
dimensions: the rate of production, the time preference losses generated by
the matching process, and the quality of the match between consumers’
preferences and the goods they ultimately consume.
1. Introduction
A middleman acts as an intermediary between the seller of a good and its potential
buyers. Agents adopt this role because it is at least as pro…table as the other roles
open to them, but what service do middlemen provide that allows them to earn
these pro…ts? And how does their presence alter the e¢ciency of the economy?
These issues are central to an understanding of middlemen. In this paper, we
study the role of middlemen in an economy in which goods are heterogeneous
and tastes are idiosyncratic. Ideally, each unit of goods should be allocated to an
agent who places a very high value on it, but a less desirable allocation is attained
when trading frictions are present. We argue that middlemen ameliorate these
¤The authors thank Shouyong Shi and the referees for their comments.frictions by holding inventories. Consumers who meet these middlemen are more
likely to obtain a good that suits their tastes.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky [5] and Yavas [7, 8] argue that the role of middlemen
is to reduce the time preference losses that occur when agents must search for
trading partners, but their explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Rubinstein and
Wolinsky [5], for example, imagine an economy in which there are three groups
of people: sellers, buyers, and middlemen. The buyers want to consume units of
a homogeneous good that are initially held by the sellers. The middlemen do not
possess or consume units of the good. The agents are randomly and repeatedly
matched, and transactions can occur only between matched agents. Rubinstein
and Wolinsky show that there can be an equilibrium in which middlemen buy
goods from sellers and re-sell them to buyers.1 However, if middlemen have no
inherent advantage over the other agents—if they are neither more patient nor
more easily matched—each group of agents is just as well o¤ when the middlemen
are active as they are when the middlemen are idle. Furthermore, any inherent
advantage causes middlemen to participate in the trading, because middlemen are
not given the option to assume the role of buyer or seller.
An alternative explanation of the role of middlemen is based upon the moral
hazard problem that arises when product quality is not immediately observable.
Biglaiser [1] and Biglasier and Friedman [2] describe environments in which the
quality of the middleman’s goods is more predictable than the quality of the
producer’s goods. Since customers prefer to deal with a middleman, middlemen
can purchase goods in large quantities. The size of their purchases allows them to
employ quality control methods that are unavailable, or unpro…table, to individual
consumers, and these controls ensure that their goods continue to be of predictable
quality.2
Li [4] presents a general equilibrium version of Biglaiser’s model. Li emphasizes
1A seller who is matched with a middleman must choose between selling to the middleman
and waiting for a match with a buyer. He has a positive rate of time preference, so he will sell
his unit of goods to the middleman for less than he would have sold it to a buyer. Similarly,
a buyer who is matched with a middleman must choose between buying from the middleman
and waiting for a match with a seller. He also has a positive rate of time preference, so he will
buy from the middleman at a somewhat higher price than he would have been willing to buy
from a seller. The middleman’s undiscounted pro…ts are equal to the gap between his sale and
purchase prices.
2Biglaiser argues that middlemen use quality controls that would be too costly for individual
consumers. Biglaiser and Friedman argue that middlemen obtain goods from several competing
sources. The middleman can then enforce quality standards by threatening to drop from its list
of suppliers any …rm that is found to be providing low quality goods.
2the moral hazard problem generated by the producer’s ability to produce low
quality goods that cannot be immediately identi…ed as such by the consumer.
Middlemen emerge by acquiring, at some cost to themselves, the ability to verify
the quality of goods. They are able to sell goods at a higher price than producers
because consumers believe that the middlemen are more likely to sell high quality
goods. Li’s middlemen are expert traders whose “real world” counterparts are
found in the markets for used cars, computers, art works, and many other goods.
This paper proposes a di¤erent role for middlemen. It is assumed that goods
are heterogeneous and that consumers have idiosyncratic tastes, so that the way
in which goods are allocated to consumers matters. Middlemen hold inventories,
so that they are better able to match people with goods. The “real world” coun-
terparts of these middlemen are found in the markets for housing, new and used
cars, clothing, and many forms of retail trade.
Furthermore, it is assumed that each supplier of goods can freely choose be-
tween the roles of middleman and producer. If improvements in the manner in
which goods are allocated to consumers are of little value (as sometimes occurs),
every supplier will choose to be a producer, and mediation will not occur. Un-
der other circumstances, the quality of the match between consumers and goods
is su¢ciently important that some suppliers will choose to be middlemen rather
than producers.
An important aspect of this approach is that the e¢ciency of trade has three
dimensions: the time preference losses induced by the delay in completing trans-
actions, the quality of the match, and the rate of production. We …nd that
middlemen in‡uence each of these dimensions:
(a) An equilibrium with middlemen always has higher match quality than an
equilibrium without them, partly because middlemen o¤er consumers a
wider variety of goods and partly because middlemen charge a higher price
(so that consumers require a better match before they will buy).
(b) There is some tendency for the rate of production tobe higher in the presence
of middlemen. In equilibrium, the rate of production is equal to the rate
of consumption. Mediation will result in faster production if middlemen
sell goods to consumers more quickly than do producers. Middlemen o¤er
a greater variety of goods than do other sellers, and hence are more likely
to conclude a sale once they have been matched. However, middlemen also
charge higher prices, making them less likely to conclude a sale. The former
3e¤ect tends to dominate the latter, so that the rate of production tends to
be higher when middlemen are present.
(c) The e¢ciency of the trading process depends in part upon the delay between
the production of a unit of goods and its ultimate consumption. (Indeed,
this is the only aspect of e¢ciency described by the Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky model.) In our model, these delays are proportional to the quantity of
goods held in the economy’s inventories. Since middlemen hold larger inven-
tories than other suppliers, the presence of middlemen raises the economy’s
inventories and increases the trading delays.
The welfare e¤ects of the …rst two factors tend to outweigh the welfare e¤ect of
the last, so that welfare tends to be higher in the presence of middlemen.
Shevchenko [6] describes a model of mediation which, like ours, is based on
heterogeneous tastes. He imagines an economy in which agents are both producers
and consumers, and in which goods of a …nite number of types are produced and
consumed. Agents are forced to search because they produce one type of good but
wish to consume another. Trade between such agents requires a double coincidence
of wants: each agent must have produced the good that the other agent wants
to consume. Middlemen facilitate trade by holding an inventory of goods. If
an agent meets a middleman, and if that middleman possesses the good that he
wishes to consume, the agent swaps the good that he produced for the good that
he wants to consume. The middleman collects a commission for this service. The
commission is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, and varies with the
composition of the middleman’s inventory. It is largest when the middleman has
few units of the good consumed by the agent and many units of the good produced
by the agent.
Although they have a number of common features, Shevchenko’s paper and our
paper focus on di¤erent issues. In Shevchenko’s model, a good is either acceptable
to a consumer or it is not. In our model, every unit is acceptable to every agent
at some price. The surplus generated within an economy depends not only on
how quickly goods are produced and sold, but also on the way in which they are
allocated to the agents. The quality of the match between goods and agents is
endogenous variable, and is one of the major determinants of economic welfare.
The di¤erence in the role played by heterogeneity gives rise to a di¤erence
in the manner in which prices are set. In Shevchenko’s model, each transaction
alters the composition of the middleman’s inventory but not its size. The price
that the middleman extracts for his services depends upon the way in which the
4transaction changes the composition of his inventory. By contrast, in our model,
each sale out of inventory reduces the size of the inventory, and restoring the size
of the inventory involves the middleman in costly search. The middleman sets his
price by trading o¤ the bene…t of a sale and the cost of search.
Finally, the papers treat inventory size and the entry decision di¤erently. Our
model restricts middleman to only two units of inventory, and imagines that a
prospective middleman must bear the costs of acquiring his inventory. Speci…cally,
he must forgo the sale of his …rst unit, search for someone to sell him a second unit,
and then pay the market price for it. By contrast, Shevchenko’s model determines
endogenously the optimal size of the middleman’s inventory. The entry decision
is, however, somewhat simpli…ed: each agent chooses between being a producer-
consumer, or a middleman possessing a fully stocked inventory. The origin of
these inventories is not described.
2. A Model of Middlemen
Consider a market in which units of a divisible numeraire good are exchanged
for units of an indivisible heterogeneous good. These goods have the following
properties:
(a) The numeraire good’s consumption value is equal to its production cost, and
is normalized at unity.
(b) The consumption value of the heterogeneous good varies across units for each
buyer and across buyers for each unit. These valuations are known to the
buyer but not observed by sellers. They are modelled as independent (across
both units and buyers) realizations of the random variable µ; which has
density f(µ) and cumulative distribution F(µ) de…ned on the unit interval:
The hazard function h(µ) ´ f(µ)=[1¡F(µ)] is assumed to be increasing and
once di¤erentiable. The cost of producing a unit of the heterogeneous good
is ° < 1:
Both goods are produced instantly as needed.
The market consists of a …xed number of agents. Every agent is in…nitely
lived and risk neutral, and every agent is able to produce the numeraire good.
A fraction 1 ¡ N of the agents are consumers of the heterogeneous good while
the fraction N of the agents supply it. Suppliers have two attributes. First, each
supplier can hold up to two units of the heterogeneous good in his inventory.
5Second, each supplier is able to produce a unit of the heterogeneous good (at
cost °) if he is not currently holding a unit of that good. The assumption that a
supplier who is holding a unit of goods cannot produce restricts the behaviour of
suppliers in two important ways. A supplier can only acquire a two-unit inventory
by buying the second unit from another supplier. A supplier must …nd a buyer
for each unit of goods that he produces before he can produce another.
Suppliers who are currently holding one unit of the heterogeneous good are
called producers, because they can maintain their one-unit inventories by pro-
ducing a new unit after each sale. Suppliers who are currently holding two units
of goods are called middlemen. Suppliers will typically switch between these
roles as time passes: the sale of a unit of goods by a middleman converts him into
a producer, and the purchase of a unit of goods by a producer converts him into
a middleman. However, at any given moment,
N = P + M (2.1)
where P and M are the fractions of agents who are producers and middlemen
respectively.
The agents are randomly and repeatedly matched such that any agent will
meet another agent, within some arbitrarily short interval, with probability ®:
Some of these meetings result in trades in which units of the numeraire good are
swapped for a single unit of the heterogeneous good.
(a) A producer who meets a consumer o¤ers to sell his unit of the heterogeneous
good at the price pC: The consumer observes the type of the good, and if he
decides to purchase it, produces the required pC units of the numeraire good.
The goods are then exchanged and consumed, and the producer produces a
new unit of the heterogeneous good.
(b) A meeting between two producers might result in a trade. One of the pro-
ducers could become a middleman by purchasing the other’s heterogeneous
good. The other producer would consume the numeraire goods received in
payment, produce another unit of the heterogeneous good, and continue as
a producer. This transaction occurs if the value of becoming a middleman
is su¢ciently high, and not otherwise. The price pM at which the heteroge-
neous good is traded, if it is traded, leaves the two producers indi¤erent as
to which side of the transaction they take.
6(c) A middleman will, upon meeting a consumer, o¤er the consumer his choice
of the goods at the price q. The consumer buys the better of the goods or
neither of them. If a sale occurs, the middleman consumes the numeraire
goods received in payment, and becomes a producer.
2.1. Consumers
Let W be the expected present discounted utility (EPDU) of a consumer. A con-
sumer will, over an arbitrarily short interval, meet a producer with probability ®P
and meet a middleman with probability ®M: The consumer will buy a producer’s
unit of the heterogeneous good if his valuation of that good exceeds its price pC.
The consumer will buy the better of two units from a middleman if his valuation




(µ ¡ pC)f(µ)dµ + ®M
Z 1
q
(µ ¡ q)[2f(µ)F(µ)]dµ (2.2)
where r is the discount rate. The …rst integral is the expected bene…t of a meeting
with a producer, and the second integral is the expected bene…t of a meeting with
a middleman.4
2.2. Producers
Producers sell units of the heterogeneous good to consumers and to other produc-
ers, and they purchase units of goods from other producers (thereby becoming
middlemen).
When a producer meets a consumer, the value that the consumer places on
the unit that he possesses is not known to the producer. The producer sets pC to
maximize the expected pro…ts from each meeting with a consumer.
When two producers meet, and one producer sells a unit of goods to the other,
each producer’s welfare is altered in a di¤erent way. The seller of the good receives
3Middlemen would be more likely to be viable if a consumer were permitted to purchase both
units of a middleman’s inventories. The contrary assumption, that the consumer purchases at
most one unit, was chosen to show that this advantage is not necessary for the success of
middlemen.
4Here, f(µ)F(µ) is the density function of the event that a particular good in a pair is the
better of the two and has value µ to the consumer. The density function of the event that the
better good has value µ to the consumer, is twice this density, because each good is equally
likely to be the better of the two.
7a payment pM; replaces the unit at cost °; and continues as a producer. The
bene…t that he receives from the transaction is simply pM¡°: The purchaser of the
good incurs a cost pM; and his status changes from producer to middleman. If V
and U are the expected present discounted utilities of the producer and middleman
respectively, the bene…t that he receives from the transaction is U ¡ V ¡ pM: If
these bene…ts were not equal, both producers would want to be on the same side
of the transaction—both would want to be the seller or both would want to be
the buyer. The price pM is assumed to adjust to equalize the bene…ts, leaving the
producers indi¤erent as to which side of the transaction they take. That is, the
price at which producers trade satis…es the condition:
pM ¡ ° = U ¡ V ¡ pM (2.3)
implying
pM = (¢ + °)=2
where:
¢ ´ U ¡ V
When pC and pM are set in this fashion, the ‡ow bene…t to being a producer
is:
rV = ®C max
pC
(pC ¡ °)(1 ¡ F(pC)) + ®P max[0;pM ¡ °]
The …rst max function is the expected pro…ts from a meeting with a consumer, and
the second max function is the expected pro…ts from a meeting with a producer.
De…ne the functions:
´x(z) ´ max
p f(p ¡ z)(1 ¡ F(p)
x)g x 2 f1;2g;z 2 [0;1]
¼x(z) ´ argmax
p f(p ¡ z)(1 ¡ F(p)
x)g
The restrictions on the hazard function imply that ¼1 and ¼2 are increasing func-
tions, and that ´1 and ´2 are decreasing and convex functions. Using this notation,
and using (2.3) to eliminate pM; yields:
rV = ®C´1(°) + ®P max[0;(¢ ¡ °)=2] (2.4)
pC = ¼1(°) (2.5)
82.3. Middlemen
A middleman meets a consumer with probability ®C: This meeting might result
in a sale of one unit of goods at price q, and a switch in status from middleman
to producer. Thus, the ‡ow bene…t to being a middleman is:
rU = ®C max
q (q ¡ ¢)[1 ¡ F(q)
2] = ®C´2(¢) (2.6)
The price q at which middlemen sell to consumers is:
q = ¼2(¢) (2.7)
2.4. Entry and Exit
As time passes, middlemen sell goods to consumers, thereby becoming producers,
and producers buys goods from other producers, thereby becoming middlemen.
The number of middlemen and the number of producers are constant through
time if middlemen are becoming producers with the same frequency as producers
are becoming middlemen. This condition can be written as:
(®P
2=2)I(¢ ¡ °) = M®(1 ¡ N)(1 ¡ F(q)
2) (2.8)
where the indicator function I is equal to 1 if producers trade with each other
and equal to 0 if they do not:5
I(¢ ¡ °) =
½
1 if ¢ ¡ ° ¸ 0
0 otherwise
The left-hand of (2.8) is the rate at which producers are becoming middlemen.
Over an arbitrarily short interval, any given producer meets another producer with
probability ®P: If trade occurs between them, that producer becomes a middleman
with probability 1/2 (and remains a producer with probability 1/2). The rate at
which producers switch roles is equal to the number of producers, P; times the
rate at which individual producers switch roles, ®IP=2: Similarly, the right-hand
side of (2.8) is the rate at which middlemen are becoming producers. This switch
occurs when a middlemen meets a consumer and concludes a sale, reducing his
inventory by one unit. Over an arbitrarily short interval, each middleman meets
5It is assumed that producers trade with each other even if they are indi¤erent between
trading and not trading. This assumption eliminates the multiple equilibria that would otherwise
occur when pM = °:
9a consumer with probability ®(1 ¡ N); and having met a consumer, completes a
sale with probability 1 ¡ F(q)2: The rate at which middlemen become producers
is equal to the number of middlemen, M; times the rate at which individual
middlemen conclude sales.
It is assumed that no supplier can be forced to participate in the market econ-
omy. A non-participant has an EPDU of 0, and a supplier can switch from being
a non-participant to being a producer simply by producing a unit of goods. Thus,
an equilibrium in which every supplier is willing to participate is characterized
by:
V ¸ ° (2.9)
It is assumed that suppliers participate if they are indi¤erent between participat-
ing and not participating.
3. Equilibrium
In any equilibrium, producers and middlemen set prices optimally, consumers
optimally choose between buying and rejecting the goods o¤ered to them, and
the N suppliers are active and optimally choose their roles. There are two kinds
of equilibria: one in which some suppliers choose to be middlemen, and one in
which no supplier makes this choice.
De…nition 1. An equilibrium with middlemen consists of an allocation of
suppliers (P;M), a set of expected present discounted utilities (U;V;W); and a
set of prices (pC;pM;q) such that (2.1)–(2.9) are satis…ed, P and M are strictly
positive, and the prices are between ° and 1.
De…nition 2. An equilibrium without middlemen consists of a set of ex-
pected present discounted utilities (U;V;W) and a set of prices (pC;pM;q) such
that (2.1)–(2.9) are satis…ed, P = N, and the prices are between ° and 1.
The nature of these equilibria is described by the following propositions. The
proofs are contained in the appendix.
Equilibrium does not exist for all parameter values, and the two types of
equilibria do not co-exist.
Proposition 1. Let N; ® and r be given. An equilibrium with middlemen exists
if and only if:
®(1 ¡ N)´2(°) ¡ r° ¸ ®(1 ¡ N)´1(°)
10Equilibrium with middlemen, if it exists, is not necessarily unique. An equilibrium
without middlemen exists if and only if:
®(1 ¡ N)´2(°) ¡ r° < ®(1 ¡ N)´1(°)
®(1 ¡ N)´1(°) ¡ r° ¸ 0
If an equilibrium without middlemen exists, it is unique.
These conditions have immediate interpretations. A supplier who chooses to
produce incurs a cost of ° units of the numeraire good. This one-time cost is
equivalent to a ‡ow cost of r°. The supplier is then able to o¤er a trade to
any consumer he meets. The ‡ow expected bene…t associated with this trading
opportunity is ®(1 ¡ N)´1(°):6 Thus, the condition:
®(1 ¡ N)´1(°) ¡ r° ¸ 0 (3.1)
states that the bene…t of production is at least as great as the cost—that trading
with consumers is a worthwhile activity. If this condition holds, the following
condition might also hold:7
®(1 ¡ N)´2(°) ¡ r° ¸ ®(1 ¡ N)´1(°) (3.2)
Acquiring a second unit of goods involves a ‡ow cost of r° but raises the ‡ow
bene…t from ®(1 ¡ N)´1(°) to ®(1 ¡ N)´2(°): Equation (3.2) states that the
bene…t is at least as great as the cost, so that suppliers are willing to take on the
middleman’s role if the bene…t is at least as great as the cost.
These inequalities imply that there are two critical values of ®(1 ¡ N)=r: If
the …rst critical value is reached, suppliers are willing to produce. If the second
critical value is reached, they are also willing to act as middlemen. The conditions
that give rise to these activities are low discount rates, frequent meetings, and a
large ratio of consumers to suppliers.
The middleman’s larger inventory of goods raises the probability of making a
sale at any given price, inducing him to set his price higher than the producer’s
price. However, the middleman’s price might be set so high that he sells goods
less quickly than a producer.
6Note that this expression assumes that any unit of goods sold will be immediately replaced,
so that the cost of engaging in trade is, as claimed, the start-up cost °:
7The former condition must hold when the latter condition holds because ´2(°) < 2(e p ¡
°)(1 ¡ F(e p) < 2´1(°) where e p ´ ¼2(°):
11Proposition 2. In an equilibrium with middlemen,
(a) Middlemen charge consumers a higher price than do producers. The rate
at which they sell goods to consumers can be either greater or smaller than
the rate at which producers sell goods to consumers.
(b) If the equilibrium is unique, an increase in ® or a decrease in r will increase
the number of middlemen and raise the price that they charge.
4. Middlemen and Welfare
The e¤ects that middlemen have upon welfare can be discovered by comparing
the behaviour of an economy when some suppliers choose to be middlemen with
the behaviour of the same economy when every supplier is a middleman.
The requirement that the two economies be identical in every respect except
for the presence of middlemen is imposed so that the change in welfare can be
unambiguously ascribed to their presence. It precludes a direct comparison be-
tween equilibrium with middlemen and equilibrium without middlemen, because
Proposition 1 shows that there are no sets of parameters under which both types
of equilibrium exist. Instead, equilibrium with middlemen will be compared to
a reference equilibrium (called producer equilibrium) in which suppliers do
not have the option of becoming middlemen. Producer equilibrium has all of the
characteristics of equilibrium without middlemen, except that it exists whenever
(3.1) is satis…ed, and hence exists whenever equilibrium with middlemen exists.
4.1. Production Rate and Match Quality
Middlemen a¤ect the economy in two ways: they change the rate at which hetero-
geneous goods are produced, and they change the manner in which these goods
are allocated to consumers. These factors are measurable. The rate at which
heterogeneous goods are produced is:8
½ ´ ®(1 ¡ N)fP(1 ¡ F(pC)) + M(1 ¡ F(q))
2g
8The expression ®f¢g is the probability with which a single consumer purchases a unit of the
heterogeneous good, so ½ is the rate at which goods are purchased. In equilibrium the rate of
production is equal to the rate of sale since producers who sell to consumers replace immediately
and (2.8) shows that the rate at which middlemen sell to consumers is equal to the rate at which
producers sell to each other.
12and the average consumption value of the goods sold is:9











The production rate ½ and match quality ¹ determine the welfare of the people
living in the economy. Speci…cally, if Z is the expected present discounted value
of the consumer surplus, the ‡ow surplus rZ is:
rZ = ½(¹ ¡ °)
It can readily be shown that:
Z = (1 ¡ N)W + MU + PV
That is, the agents in the economy are competing for shares of Z:
Producer equilibrium and equilibrium with middlemen di¤er in the equilibrium
values of ½ and ¹:
(a) Equilibrium requires units of the heterogeneous good to be produced and
sold at the same rate. It follows that an economy with middlemen will
produce goods at a faster rate than a producer economy if and only if mid-
dlemen sell goods more quickly than producers. That is, ½ rises with the
number of middlemen if and only if F(q)2 is less than F(pC): Proposition
2 states that this condition might hold, but will not necessarily hold. The
relative sizes of these probabilities depends upon the precise form of the
distribution function, so the e¤ect of middlemen on the rate of production
is uncertain.
(b) Consumers who meet middlemen will, on average, buy more valuable goods
than consumers who meet producers. There are two reasons for this out-
come. First, they face higher prices and therefore have higher reservation
values. Second, they have a choice of two goods rather than one, and choose
the better of the two if both are acceptable. It follows that ¹ is greater in
an equilibrium with middlemen than in a producer equilibrium.
9The numerator is the expected consumption value of the goods sold over some arbitrarily
short interval, and the denominator is the quantity of goods sold over that interval. The ratio
therefore represents average value.
13® = 4:5 ® = 45
middlemen producer middlemen producer
¢ 0.255 0.308
P 0.318 0.50 0.313 0.5
½ 0.513 0.45 5.026 4.5
¹ 0.820 0.80 0.838 0.8
Z 0.353 0.30 3.483 3.0
Y 0.137 0.10 0.137 0.1
Z ¡ Y 0.217 0.20 3.346 2.9
Table 4.1: Comparing Equilibrium with Middlemen to Producer Equilibrium
If middlemen raise the rate of production, their presence unambiguously raises
surplus. Otherwise, the impact of middlemen upon Z depends upon the relative
sizes of the changes in ¹ and ½:
We examined a number of equilibria in which valuations were uniformly dis-
tributed, and were unable to …nd an instance in which ¹ and ½ moved in opposite
directions. Two of these equilibria are described in Table 4.1. In both sets, N is
equal to 0.5, ° is equal to 0.2, and r is equal to 0.9. The …rst set of calculations
assumes that ® is equal to 4.5, and the second set assumes that ® is equal to 45.
4.2. The Cost of Delay
The variable Z measures the present discounted value of surplus given that the
economy begins in a particular equilibrium and remains there forever. It can be
used to compare steady states, but it cannot be used to measure the welfare e¤ects
of moving from one equilibrium to another. That movement involves a transition
period during which suppliers adopt new roles, prices adjust, and inventories are
built up or run down. The welfare e¤ects of these transitions cannot be accurately
calculated because the dynamics of the model have not been completely speci…ed.
Even in the absence of true dynamics, one might suspect that comparing
Z across economies would overstate the welfare gains generated by middlemen.
Steady states with more middlemen also have higher levels of inventories, and
these inventories must have been accumulated along the path to the steady state.
Inventory accumulation requires goods to be produced but not sold, implying a
14reduction in consumer surplus. This loss might be ampli…ed or o¤set by other
elements of the dynamics, but it is surely important.
The size of this loss can be estimated by considering “test-tube economies”
which begin in a steady state and stay there. In each steady state, some sup-
pliers are initially producers and some are initially middlemen. Each producer
is equipped with one unit of the heterogeneous good, and each middlemen is
equipped with two. The cost of equipping the suppliers with their initial invento-
ries is Y; where:
Y = °(P + 2M)
This is only a set-up cost: once the economy has begun to operate, the agents
will be responsible for restoring their inventories in the usual fashion. The net
bene…ts associated with any given equilibrium are therefore equal to the present
discounted value of the consumer surplus generated by that equilibrium, Z; less
the set-up cost of the equilibrium, Y:
The ‡ow of net bene…ts can be written as:
r(Z ¡ Y ) = ½(¹ ¡ °) ¡ rY
The last term is the ‡ow cost of carrying inventories. It represents the time pref-
erence losses that arise because there is a delay between the production of goods
and their ultimate consumption. Thus, this equation divides ‡ow net bene…ts into
the three components discussed in the introduction: rate of production ½; match
quality ¹; and the cost of delay in the trading process rY: The examples in Table
4.1 show that each of these components is higher when middlemen are present.
This result is interesting because the e¢ciency gains generated by middlemen in
the Rubinstein and Wolinsky model result from the middleman’s ability to reduce
the cost of delay.10 In our examples, this result is reversed: there are e¢ciency
gains even though middlemen, by holding larger inventories, increase the cost of
delay.
5. Summary
A general equilibrium model in which some agents choose to become middlemen
has been described. These agents ameliorate market frictions by o¤ering con-
sumers a choice of goods. Consumers typically …nd that the best of the goods
10In the Rubinstein and Wolinsky model, the costs of delay are reduced by middlemen only
if the middlemen are more patient or match more frequently. Neither of these possibilities is
allowed in our model.
15o¤ered by a middleman is more valuable to them than the good o¤ered by a
producer—that is, that the expected gains from trade between a consumer and
a middleman are greater than those between a consumer and a producer. The
middleman charges a higher price than does the producer, and buys from produc-
ers more cheaply than do consumers. The gains from mediation can be measured
along three dimensions: rate of production, time preference losses generated by
the matching process, and the quality of the match between consumers’ prefer-
ences and the goods they ultimately consume.
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Appendix
De…nition 3. Let N and A ´ ®=r be given. Apair (P;¢) is a reduced solution
if it satis…es the equations:
(P
2=2)I = (N ¡ P)(1 ¡ N)
£
1 ¡ F (¼2(¢))
2¤
(A1)
16¢ = A(1 ¡ N)[´2(¢) ¡ ´1(°)] ¡ (AP=2)max[0;¢ ¡ °] (A2)
and the inequalities:
0 · P · N
0 · ¢ · 1
Lemma 1. Let N and A ´ ®=r be given, and let ¢¤ < 1 be the unique value of
¢ satisfying the condition:
A(1 ¡ N)[´2(¢) ¡ ´1(°)] = ¢
Also, let e P be the root of the quadratic equation:
P
2=2 = (N ¡ P)(1 ¡ N)
£
1 ¡ F (¼2(°))
2¤
that lies between 0 and N: If ¢¤ > °; there exists an odd number of reduced
solutions, and each solution satis…es the inequalities 0 < P < e P and ° < ¢ < ¢¤:
If ¢¤ = °; the only reduced solution is (e P;°): If ¢¤ < °; the only reduced solution
is (N;¢¤):
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the cases ¢¤ > ° and ¢¤ · ° in turn.
(a) If ¢¤ is greater than °, the graph of (A1) in the (P;¢) positive quadrant
is continuous and downward sloping. By the de…nition of e P; one of its endpoints
is (e P;°): Since lim¢!1¼2(¢) = 1; the other endpoint is (0,1). The graph of
(A2) is also continuous and downward sloping. By the de…nition of ¢¤, one of its
endpoints is (0;¢¤): To …nd the behaviour of the graph as ¢ approaches °; write
(A2) as:
(AP=2)max[0;¢ ¡ °] = A(1 ¡ N)[´2(¢) ¡ ´1(°)] ¡ ¢
Since the right-hand side is bounded away from zero when ° · ¢ < ¢¤; this
equation can only be satis…ed if P approaches in…nity as ¢ approaches °, that is,
if (A2) has an asymptote at ¢ = °: To summarize: (i) both graphs are continuous
and downward sloping in the (P;¢) positive quadrant, (ii) the graph of (A1) lies
above the graph of (A2) when P is equal to 0, and (iii) the graph of (A1) lies
below the graph of (A2) when P is equal to e P: It immediately follows that the
graphs must intersect an odd number of times over the domain (0; e P): Each point
of intersection is a reduced solution.
(b) Now suppose that ¢¤ is not greater than °: Equation (A2) is only satis…ed
when ¢ is equal to ¢¤: Substituting this value into (A1) yields P. If ¢ = ¢¤ = °;
so that I = 1; P is equal to e P: If ¢ = ¢¤ < °; so that I = 0; P is equal to N:
17Proof of Proposition 1: Each equilibrium can be determined by block
recursion. Equation (A2) is obtained by combining (2.4) and (2.6), and equation
(A1) is an equilibrium condition, so each reduced solution gives a pair (P;¢) from
which an equilibrium can be developed. The prices are then determined by (2.3),
(2.5) and (2.7); and the expected present discounted utilities are determined by
(2.2), (2.4) and (2.6). Now consider the two kinds of equilibria:
(a) There are active middlemen if P is less than N; which requires ¢¤ ¸ °; or
equivalently,
A(1 ¡ N)[´2(°) ¡ ´1(°)] ¸ °
But ´2(°) < 2(¼2(°) ¡ °)(1 ¡ F(¼2(°))) < 2´1(°); so this inequality implies that:
V = A(1 ¡ N)´1(°) > °
as required by (2.9).
(b) There are no active middlemen if P is equal to N; which requires:
A(1 ¡ N)[´2(°) ¡ ´1(°)] < °
The inequality (2.9) need not then be satis…ed, so an equilibrium with middlemen
exists only if the inequality:
A(1 ¡ N)´1(°) ¸ °
is satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) The price charged by producers, pC, is the price
p that satis…es the …rst-order condition:
1 ¡ F(pC) = (pC ¡ °)f(pC)
implying:
(1 ¡ F(pC))(1 + F(pC)) = (pC ¡ °)f(pC)(1 + F(pC)) > 2(pC ¡ °)f(pC)F(pC)
The price charged by a middleman takes its smallest value when ¢ is equal to °:
This minimum price, q, is the value of p that satis…es the …rst-order condition:
(1 ¡ F(p))(1 + F(p)) = 2(p ¡ °)f(p)F(p)
The second-order conditions for the middleman’s optimization problem imply that
the value of p satisfying this condition exceeds pC: The probability that a pro-
ducer sells a unit of goods to a consumer is 1 ¡ F(pC) and the probability that
18a middleman sells a unit of goods is bounded above by 1 ¡ F(q)2: These prob-
abilities cannot be compared without placing strong restrictions on the form of
the probability distribution. (b) The equilibrium is unique when the graphs of
(A1) and (A2) cross only once. A change in the value of A shifts only one curve,
generating unambiguous comparative statics. ¥
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